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IT DEPENDS: RECASTING INTERNET 
CLICKWRAP, BROWSEWRAP, “I AGREE,” AND 
CLICK-THROUGH PRIVACY CLAUSES AS 
WAIVERS OF ADHESION 
CHARLES E. MACLEAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Digital giants, enabled by America’s courts, Congress, and the Federal Trade 
Commission, devise click-through, clickwrap, browsewrap, “I Agree” waivers, and 
other legal fictions that purport to evidence user “consent” to consumer privacy 
erosions. It is no longer enough to justify privacy invasions as technologically 
inevitable or as essential to the American economy. As forced consent is no consent 
at all, privacy policies must advance with the technology. This article discusses 
adhesion waivers, the potential for FTC corrective action, and a comparison to 
privacy policies of the European Union. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Enter the following query into Google:  adult diapers. Then watch the computer 
screen as pop-up advertisements simultaneously appear for multiple brands of adult 
diapers, including Tena, Tranquility, Prevail, and, of course, Depends. Google 
instantaneously sold your consumer data to marketers eager to make a buck.1 Deep 
                                                
 * Associate Dean of Faculty and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School; 
J.D. (William Mitchell College of Law); M.B.A. (University of Minnesota). The author 
extends special thanks to the coordinators of the Cleveland State Law Review Symposium: 
Regulating Big Data in the Digital Age, April 8, 2016, for which these materials were initially 
prepared. The author also recognizes the research and conceptual assistance of Youngwoo 
Ban, Research Librarian and Assistant Professor of Law at Indiana Tech Law School. 
 1 Months after entering this query, the author continues to receive regular advertisements 
for adult diapers; that should come as no surprise because fully 90% of Google’s 2015 
revenues are derived from advertisements. Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 1, 15 
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in the bowels of Google’s privacy waiver documents, every Google user is deemed 
to have “consented” to these consumer data privacy erosions.2 Big data, marketers, 
resellers, and Internet service providers digitally track consumers, such as those in 
the diaper example, not only because they can, but also because there is money to be 
made doing it. The problem becomes compounded when those digital giants, 
enabled by America’s courts, Congress, and the Federal Trade Commission, devise 
click-through, clickwrap, browsewrap, “I Agree” waivers, and other legal fictions 
that purport to evidence user “consent” to these consumer privacy erosions.  
Imagine a customer, upon entering a brick-and-mortar retail store, is approached 
by a clerk and told, “I will let you look around our store and even buy an item or 
two. However, this access only comes if you agree to disclose to us every website 
you visit for the next several years along with your physical locations in real time, 
your friends’ identities and photographs, and all online purchases you make during 
that same time period. Further, you must let me sell all that information about you to 
whomever I wish for any purpose at all.” Any reasonable customer would turn 
around and walk right out of that store. Yet, in the Internet era, virtually all online 
marketers gather exactly that data and much more from all visitors and customers of 
their online “stores.”3 We have allowed marketers empowered with the latest 
computer gadgetry to victimize both our privacy and us. As President Barack 
Obama’s White House noted when it proposed a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights in 
2012, “it is incumbent on us to do what we have done throughout history:  apply our 
timeless privacy values to the new technologies and circumstances of our times.”4 
Nonetheless, all branches of our federal government have enabled this privacy 
erosion. The government’s justification for such large-scale collection and 
dissemination of private consumer data is largely ex post rationalization. The theory 
goes that allowing marketers to track all of this private consumer data has the 
allegedly salutary benefit of allowing those marketers to better target their 
advertisements to users who are likely to be genuinely interested in the advertised 
products. This is why once a user engages in online cost comparisons for baby 
strollers, the user is thereafter inundated with pop-up ads from one vendor after 
another with advertisements for strollers and other baby-related items. But is the 
modest shopping convenience really worth the cost of all that privacy erosion? Are 
                                                
(Feb. 11, 2016) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/goog10-k2015.htm. 
 2 Privacy & Terms, GOOGLE, 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en// 
intl/en/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf (last updated Aug. 29, 2016). Google’s 
privacy and terms of service documents exceed 12,000 words, not including Google’s Product 
Privacy Guide that boasts thirty-seven separate constituent documents. Id. I venture to say that no 
one, other than Google’s corps of attorneys, has read and understood that entire consumer privacy 
library.  
 3 Online Tracking More Common Than Most Realize: A Survey of 1 Million Top Websites 
Finds that 88 Percent Share User Data with Third Parties, SCIENCEDAILY (Nov. 10, 2015), 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/11/151110093923.htm. 
 4 Danny Weitzner, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Calls for a Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights for the Digital Age, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-calls-
consumer-privacy-bill-rights-digital-age. 
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American consumers and their elected representatives willing to wade into the 
Internet and take back their consumer privacy rights? Where does this data reside? In 
which countries? On which servers? Who has access? Who controls and protects the 
data? 
The digital age has ushered in an age of privacy erosion unparalleled in history. 
Perhaps the closest analog occurred in the nineteenth century when photography and 
the growth of newspapers combined to put on the front page what once was hidden 
in the parlor. Louis Brandeis wrote in 1890 about this last era of privacy erosion.5 En 
route to recommending broad adoption of a right to privacy, later-Justice Brandeis 
and his co-author presaged the digital age: 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to 
the individual . . . the right “to be left alone.” . . . The common law 
secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others [and each individual] generally retains the power to fix the limits 
of publicity which shall be given them. . . . The common law has always 
recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its 
own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts 
thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the 
back door to idle or prurient curiosity?6 
Similarly, in the digital age, when private consumer data—through the wide-
open “back door”—is so freely captured, used, resold, reused, aggregated, and more, 
for profit alone and largely without the knowing and voluntary consent of the 
consumer subject of the data, our right to privacy has been eroded almost beyond 
repair.  
Consider even a single provider, Verizon Wireless, that provides telephone and 
wireless Internet access to its users. There is a wide swath of personal information 
that Verizon users share with the company each day:  telephone numbers called, 
duration of those calls, moment-by-moment geo-location from cell tower 
triangulation, websites and webpages visited, contact information, email 
correspondence and all attachments, search queries, usernames, passwords, dates of 
birth, Social Security numbers, banking records and transactions, the contents of text 
messages, purchases, browsing details, credit card numbers, addresses, friends, 
photographs, videos, and so on.7 Now imagine that the user, probably without any 
conscious awareness, is magically deemed to have consented to the sharing and 
release of that data to third parties when the user simply clicked the “I Agree” button 
months or years before. One cannot deny the ease and convenience of technology, 
but must we sacrifice so much privacy en route? 
It is no longer enough to justify privacy invasions as technologically inevitable or 
as essential to the American economy. Congress must step in to legislate a path to 
                                                
 5 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195-220 (1890). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Privacy Policy, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/full-privacy-policy 
(last updated May 2016). 
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renewed consumer privacy and enable agencies and courts to enforce the path. It is 
no longer acceptable to disingenuously claim that click-through, clickwrap, 
browsewrap, “I Agree” waivers, and other legal fictions amount to real, knowing, 
voluntary consent. Instead, these legal fictions are waivers of adhesion:  the price 
consumers are forced to pay for access to the Internet. Opaque privacy waivers that 
consumers merely click through without understanding are no substitute for real and 
substantive consumer privacy protections in the digital age. Forced consent is not 
consent at all. 
II. THE MISCHIEF WROUGHT BY CONTRACTS OF ADHESION 
Contracts of adhesion are form contracts, drafted and controlled in all respects by 
the party in the vastly superior bargaining position, that leave to the weaker 
contracting party only two options:  (1) adhere to the terms as drafted by the party 
with superior power, or (2) reject its terms entirely.8 With contracts of adhesion, 
there is, by definition, no negotiation option; it is strictly take-it-or-leave-it.9  
Of course, contracts of adhesion are not automatically unenforceable. Rather, in 
most jurisdictions, there is a two-part disjunctive test:  (1) if the contract of adhesion 
or its terms fall outside of the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, the 
contract will not be enforceable as against that weaker party;10 or (2) even if the 
contract of adhesion or its terms falls within the reasonable expectations of the 
weaker party, the contract will not be enforceable if its terms are unconscionable or 
unduly oppressive.11 Either is sufficient; the weaker party need not show both. 
III. INTERNET CLICKWRAP CLAUSES AS CONTRACTS—AND WAIVERS OF 
ADHESION 
In a contract of adhesion, the weaker party, who is powerless against the stronger 
party who drafted the contract and is unable to negotiate any modifications to the 
contract of adhesion, can only escape the contract’s terms if the terms are not as 
expected or are otherwise unconscionable or unduly burdensome.12 Consumers face 
this exact situation when in the midst of Internet shopping; the shopper must click 
the “I Agree” button to complete the purchase. This button is a clickwrap 
agreement.13 The seller drafted the terms of the contract and all the implicit and 
explicit privacy waivers contained therein, and the consumer is powerless to offer or 
                                                
 8 1 MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 8:26 (2015). 
 9 Id.; William Alan Nelson, Take It or Leave It: Unconscionabillity of Mandatory Pre-
Dispute Arbitration Agreements in the Securities Industry, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573 (2015). 
 10 Yasamine Hashemi, Facebook’s Privacy Policy and Its Third-Party Partnerships: 
Lucrativity and Liability, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 140, 157-58 (2009); see generally Zev J. 
Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and 
Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381 (2008). 
 11 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 12:13 (2016); 
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 6:65 (2015); see also U.C.C. § 2-
302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 12 NIMMER & DODD, supra note 11; NIMMER, supra note 11. 
 13 Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 21-22 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002); HOWARD O. 
HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:48 (2016). 
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negotiate any substantive amendments to the waiver, which constitutes a contract. 
Furthermore, most consumers are completely unaware of the terms they are waiving; 
thus, those waiver terms fall outside of the reasonable expectations of the average 
consumer. The terms are uncontrollable, unconscionable, and oppressive when the 
collected data, metadata, cookies, keylogs, shopping histories, Internet search 
histories, URLs, emails, mothers’ maiden names, credit card numbers, and the like 
are shared intentionally or inadvertently online with big data aggregators and data 
resellers that sell those formerly private consumer data to the highest bidders.14 
The issues related to the forum, choice of law, arbitration, licensing, service, and 
liability terms of these Internet contracts of adhesion have been widely litigated in 
courts and discussed in the literature.15 Typically, courts have upheld clickwrap 
agreements to those extents, particularly if the user had the easy ability to print its 
terms, had to affirmatively indicate assent (as by clicking “I Agree”), and had the 
option of rejecting the agreement in its entirety.16 The privacy waiver features of 
these Internet clickwrap “agreements” have been far less frequently addressed. 
Although clickwrap agreements are clearly “waivers of adhesion,” that phrase has 
never appeared in any appellate opinion or secondary source in American law.17 As 
an early commentator noted, 
Click-wrap contracts are regularly formed on websites. When a purchase 
is made, the user is typically asked to agree to terms and conditions, and 
sites that allow user postings such as discussion forums and chat rooms 
usually require member agreements as a condition of registration. By 
incorporating the privacy policy into a click-wrap user agreement, or 
turning it into one, the website can potentially limit remedies and 
damages, exclude consequential damages, provide for notice of and a 
right to cure any breach, require mandatory dispute-resolution 
mechanisms such as a negotiation-mediation-arbitration sequence, specify 
governing law and forum, shorten the statute of limitations, extract 
representations from the user (e.g., as to nationality or age), provide for 
contingencies through a force majeure clause, and create clear evidence of 
binding consents or waivers. 
 
                                                
 14 Timothy J. Van Hal, Taming the Golden Goose: Private Companies, Consumer 
Geolocation Data, and the Need for a Class Action Regime for Privacy Protection, 15 VAND. 
J. ENT. TECH. L. 713, 721-22 (2013). 
 15 See Nathan J. Davis, Note, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589 (2007); see also Lucille M. Ponte, Getting a Bad Rap? 
Unconscionability in Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the 
Quality of These Online Consumer “Products,” 26 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 120 (2011). 
 16 See, e.g., Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet Comm., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5463(CM)(GWG), 
2011 WL 744732, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20536, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2011). 
 17 With a nod toward Professor Haynes’s outstanding 2007 article, in which she noted, 
“Rather than providing consumers the protection they expect, privacy policies have become 
one more online contract of adhesion for consumers to avoid.” Allyson W. Haynes, Online 
Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 587, 624 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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Given the minimal money damages likely to result from any given 
privacy breach and the probability that most consumer complaints can be 
resolved with a sincere apology and a promise to do better (or to delete 
the information), it is fair to ask whether a contractual privacy policy is 
overkill. The two-word answer is: class actions.18 
As discussed in the following section, inertia and perceived inevitability have 
brought us to this point. 
IV. HOW DID WE GET HERE; WHY DO WE ALLOW THESE PRIVACY 
WAIVERS OF ADHESION? 
Two predominant factors—both related to public perceptions of inevitability—
have conspired to bring us to today’s situation where online consumer privacy 
evaporates with a click:  (1) inertia associated with the public’s subjective belief that 
digital advancement must sacrifice individual privacy,19 and (2) an inordinate and 
largely unsupported fear that even the slightest impediment to free online trade will 
inevitably, substantially, and adversely impact the U.S. economy.20 Neither is 
inevitable. 
Think of the police search and seizure analog. In the absence of regulation and 
oversight through the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers would seriatim 
use every new technological device to pierce suspects’ privacy in search of 
evidence.21 Similarly, online marketers and data aggregators will use every new 
technology and privacy-eroding tracking technique or privacy waiver unless 
Congress or the FTC22 precludes its use. One can scarcely blame either group. There 
                                                
 18 Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and in 
Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 93 (1999). 
 19 See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 844 (2002); see generally Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an 
Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 360 (2015); Sarah Elwood, 
Privacy, Reconsidered: New Representations, Data Practices, and the Geoweb, 42 GEOFORUM 
6, 6 (2011). 
 20 See MaryAnne M. Gobble, Regulating Innovation in the New Economy, 58 RES. TECH. 
MGMT. 62, 63 (2015); see also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Internet of Things and the FTC: 
Does Innovation Require Intervention?, Remarks Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 9 
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ohlhausen/131008internet thingsremarks.pdf; 
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598-99 (2014); Mozelle Thompson, Keynote Address: The Federal 
Trade Commission and Regulating E-Commerce, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEG. COMMENT. 609, 615 
(2002); Isabell Koske et al., The Internet Economy—Regulatory Challenges and Practices 
(OECD Working Paper No. 1171, 2014). 
 21 See Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the 
Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 47, 50 (2014); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (holding evidence obtained through the use of a thermal-imaging device 
inadmissible because it was a type of technology that was not readily available to the public). 
 22 See, e.g., Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? 
Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 1, 1 (2009). 
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are crimes to be solved in the first instance, and there is money to be made in the 
second.23 Nonetheless, in past instances of technology eroding privacy beyond our 
community privacy “threshold,” Congress (and sometimes the courts24) has stepped 
in.25 And of course, although our reasonable expectations of privacy can evaporate to 
near extinction as technology advances,26 we can always reset the privacy bar by 
way of congressional enactment and appellate precedent. It is time we do exactly 
that in Internet privacy waivers of adhesion. 
There is no longer any reason to entertain the flimsy and unsupportable legal 
fiction that by physically clicking the “I Agree” button, we have knowingly, 
voluntarily, or intelligently waived a thing. Rather, this is another example where 
technological advancements proceed as the hare while constitutional privacy 
jurisprudence and congressional and FTC intervention move at paces more akin to 
the tortoise. 
The concerns here are far more expansive than simply a Luddite wish for a return 
to “the good old days.” On the contrary, with Big Data and the big business of data 
aggregation and data sharing, consumers—in the henhouse—need to be protected by 
the FTC, Congress, and the courts; we cannot justify leaving the protection of 
consumers in their henhouses to the foxes who are collecting and profiting from the 
aggregation, sale, and resale of all this formerly private consumer data.27  
Although the digital age seems mature in some senses, it is really in its infancy. 
Yet, consumer privacy in most aspects has already been compromised almost 
beyond repair.28 On the Internet, that data resides in perpetuity only to be mixed and 
matched and aggregated into a data basket of information for sale to the highest 
bidder. Our medical records have been digitized and are vulnerable. Our Internet 
browsing history is vulnerable, too. Additionally, we have consumer ID cards we use 
at grocery stores, enabling them to track, store, and disseminate our shopping 
history.  
And once a consumer has more-or-less willingly turned over to online marketers 
the keys to his or her privacy kingdom, along with credit card and bank account 
                                                
 23 See id. 
 24 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 259 (1967) (addressing the legality of an 
interception of a phone conversation in a public phone booth). 
 25 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 et seq. (2016); 
Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2016). 
 26 After all, in the digital age, can anyone credibly argue and reasonably believe that 
anything is truly private? Cell phones can be searched in seconds. The National Security 
Agency, enabled by FISA, seizes cellphone metadata. GPS tracking allows real-time tracking 
of anyone, anywhere. Smartphone apps basically require locational services and access to 
your contacts and photographs. Your Internet searches are tracked. Keyloggers, viruses, 
malware, cookies, bots, and crawlers mine previously private enclaves for personal data. Your 
cars have a blackbox that tracks speed and other operational data. The list goes on and will 
exponentially grow as the digital age plays out. 
 27 Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Secker & Warburg 1949) (paralleling the current 
skepticism toward Big Data to “Big Brother”). 
 28 Richard van Hooijdonk, In this Digital Age, Your Privacy is Continuously Invaded, 
INST. ETHICS & EMERGING TECH. (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/vanhooijdonk20150924. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
50 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:43 
 
numbers, social security numbers, and mothers’ maiden names, the online marketers 
are just the first entities to possess these private data, but they are certainly not the 
last.29 Many on-line marketers sell their caches of private consumer data to other 
marketers. Indeed, one can helpfully differentiate between first-party data gatherers, 
who have a direct relationship with the tracked user, and third-party data gatherers, 
who purchase consumer data from first-party gatherers and mine the Internet for 
dozens more data points about those same users. Users’ private data, including 
health records, pregnancy status, HIV status, credit scores, assets, debts, and 
purchase and browsing history, are all readily available from third-party consumer 
data vendors. Perhaps more disturbing is that all the heretofore private data on 
consumers are susceptible to domestic and foreign hackers and other unintended 
dissemination and sharing of private facts about American consumers.30 
For the moment, the immediate challenge is that American consumers believe, 
and act as if they believe, that they are powerless to stem the tide of personal 
consumer data collection by online marketers. As one 2015 study notes, “Americans 
believe it is futile to manage what companies can learn about them . . . [the majority] 
do not want to lose control over their information but also believe this loss of control 
has already happened.”31 In that study of American consumers:  
49% incorrectly believed a supermarket must obtain the consumer’s 
permission before selling information about the consumer’s purchases to 
other companies; 
 
69% inaccurately thought a pharmacy must have your permission before 
selling to others information about the over-the-counter products you have 
purchased; 
 
65% falsely believed that if a company has a “privacy policy,” that means 
the company will not share consumer data with others without consumer 
permission; 
 
91% believed it is not fair for business to collect consumer data without 
their knowledge; 
 
71% felt it was not fair for businesses that provide free in-store Wi-Fi to 
collect surfing and use data from consumers using the service; 
 
64% wrongly believed that clearing cookies on a cell phone prevented 
marketers from tracking the user; 
 
                                                
 29 Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2012. 
 30 Christopher Mims, The Hacked Data Broker? Be Very Afraid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 
2015. 
 31 JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE 
MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 3 (Univ. 
of Pa., Annenberg Sch. for Commc’n 2015). 
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84% want to be empowered to control what data businesses collect from 
them on-line; but 
 
65% report that they have come to accept that they have little control over 
what marketers can learn about on-line consumers; and 
 
only 18% of all Internet users have activated a “do not track” feature to 
prevent online marketers from tracking and logging their consumer 
information and activity.32 
 
If one examines these results, it appears that those consumers who are more 
aware of the depth and breadth realities of on-line data collection by marketers are 
the most resigned to the inevitability of that data collection. The most informed have 
given up. 
As the Wall Street Journal reported in 2010, “One of the fastest-growing 
businesses on the Internet . . . is the business of spying on Internet users.”33 And why 
not? It is, after all, big business indeed. Recent studies suggest that buying and 
selling otherwise private consumer data mined from the Internet will soon top $60 
billion in annual revenue in the U.S. alone.34 We ought not to blame the Internet 
marketers, first-party data gatherers, third-party data aggregators, and those who 
purchase consumer data from them. They are just following a free market model; 
they are simply entering a profitable market. In reality, the regulators and legislators 
are the ones at fault and, therefore, the ones who hold the keys to the solutions. For 
example, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the federal agency most broadly 
charged with consumer protection, and the agency talks a good game (“In today’s 
world . . . companies are collecting, storing, and sharing more information about 
consumers than ever before . . . they should not do so at the expense of consumer 
privacy”35) and has some solid policy stances (such as, “[t]he Commission now also 
calls on Congress to consider enacting baseline privacy legislation and reiterates its 
call for data security legislation”36). Nevertheless, the FTC has largely served as the 
chief apologist and enabler of data privacy erosion, focusing on industry self-
regulation rather than on top-down legislated limits on consumer data privacy 
erosion.37  
                                                
 32 Id. at 4, 12-16. 
 33 Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010. 
 34 Nathan Newman, How Big Data Enables Economic Harm to Consumers, Especially to 
Low-Income and Other Vulnerable Sectors of the Population, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/08/00015-92370.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2016). 
 35 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS i (Mar. 2012). 
 36 Id. 
 37 FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF REPORT, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2015). 
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Even the FTC’s data privacy enforcement actions have been largely ineffective.38 
When the FTC compelled Google and Facebook to more clearly disclose to 
consumers the private consumer data they were capturing and selling to others,39 the 
result was not more consumer protection, but merely more dense and indecipherable 
privacy disclosures that most users simply click through without reading—and 
                                                
 38 There have been a few notable exceptions, such as the 2012 FTC agreement with 
Facebook (In re Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, Decision & Order (July 27, 2012)), which was 
based on these FTC findings:  
 
• In December 2009, Facebook changed its website so 
certain information that users may have designated as private—
such as their Friends List—was made public. They did not warn 
users that this change was coming, or get their approval in 
advance. 
 
• Facebook represented that third-party apps that users’ 
installed would have access only to user information that they 
needed to operate. In fact, the apps could access nearly all of 
users' personal data—data the apps didn’t need. 
• Facebook told users they could restrict sharing of data to 
limited audiences—for example with “Friends Only.” In fact, 
selecting “Friends Only” did not prevent their information from 
being shared with third-party applications their friends used. 
• Facebook had a “Verified Apps” program & claimed it 
certified the security of participating apps. It didn’t. 
 
• Facebook promised users that it would not share their 
personal information with advertisers. It did. 
 
• Facebook claimed that when users deactivated or deleted 
their accounts, their photos and videos would be inaccessible. 
But Facebook allowed access to the content, even after users 
had deactivated or deleted their accounts. 
 
• Facebook claimed that it complied with the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Framework that governs data transfer between the U.S. 
and the European Union. It didn’t. 
 
The proposed settlement bars Facebook from making any 
further deceptive privacy claims. 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived 
Consumers By Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-
keep. 
 39 Cameron Scott, Less than Half of Facebook, Google Users Understand Sites’ Privacy 
Policies, COMPUTERWORLD  (May 4, 2012), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2503822/data-privacy/less-than-half-of-facebook--
google-users-understand-sites--privacy-policies.html. 
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certainly without understanding. Therefore, the consumers do not truly consent to 
the data privacy erosion. 
To compound the problem, all of the consumer data privacy erosion is largely 
irreparable and likely irreversible. That is to say that consumer data that has already 
been digitally disclosed, stored, and aggregated is irretrievable, but these past 
privacy breaches do not free us from the obligation to prevent future data privacy 
erosions. Once data resides on the Internet, it is very difficult or impossible to erase. 
Firms routinely take snapshots of the Internet that yield the cached webpages that 
turn up on your browser searches.40 Immense amounts of these data can be stored in 
a very small physical space and thus are easily transported, shared, and stolen.41 
Hackers have successfully targeted data stored in banks, hospitals, stores, and even 
government computers. According to one source, the Pentagon and the National 
Security Agency each repelled approximately ten million attempted cyber-intrusions 
per day in 2014!42 An estimated one million new malware threats were unleashed 
each day of 2014 alone.43 In 2014, private data concerning 110 million consumers 
was stolen from Target, another 83 million from J.P. Morgan Chase, and 56 million 
from Home Depot.44 The consumer data stolen from Target earned the cyber-thieves 
at least $53.7 million on the black market and cost Target at least $148 million.45 
The resultant downstream consequences in cybercrime, identity theft, and even 
extortion based on stolen consumer data are skyrocketing.46 
V. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION IS TAKING A STAND 
WHERE IT HAS JURISDICTION 
The FTC mainly has taken a rather laissez-faire approach to consumer data 
privacy erosions, leaving it to the data gathering and marketing industries to 
determine the state-of-the-art and best practices in data protections.47 Thus, in spite 
                                                
 40 See Bernard J. Jansen et al., Real Life, Real Users, and Real Needs: A Study and 
Analysis of User Queries on the Web, 36 INFO. PROCESSING & MGMT. 207, 207 (2000) 
(reporting the results of a research project that analyzed 51,473 web queries that internet users 
submitted into a popular web search engine) 
 41 Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, 
Communicate, and Compute Information, SCIENCE (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/332/6025/60.full; Sharon Tobias, The Year in 
Cyberattacks, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2014. 
 42 U.S. Hit with More Than 5,000 Attacks Every Hour, NETSTANDARD, July 7, 2014; Paul 
W. Tinker, For the Common Defense of Cyberspace: Implications of a US Cyber Militia on 
Department of Defense Cyber Operations (Dec. 6, 2015) (unpublished M.M.A.S thesis, US 
Army Command and General Staff College) (on file with U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College). 
 43 Virginia Harrison & Jose Pagliery, Nearly 1 Million New Malware Threats Released 
Every Day, CNNMONEY, Apr. 14, 2015. 
 44 Tobias, supra note 41. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014). 
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of some more recent improvements in agency interventions,48 the FTC has been a 
meek overseer. Another federal watchdog agency, the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”), which has oversight and enforcement authority far in excess 
of the FTC in many respects, particularly with respect to telecommunications, 
appears to be moving in a better direction.49 One clear FCC privacy protection path 
involves passage of its proposed Broadband Internet Access Service (“BIAS”) 
provider regulations,50 which would overhaul regulation of Internet service provider 
privacy approaches and reset the privacy bar. The notice and comment period 
continues as this article is in the publication process. 
In March 2016, the FCC entered into a Consent Order51 with Verizon, fined 
Verizon $1.35 million, and compelled the company to stop using “supercookies” to 
track users and target advertising without consumer consent unless each consumer 
had opted in.52 As the FCC Enforcement Bureau Chief noted, “Consumers care 
about privacy and should have a say in how their personal information is used, 
especially when it comes to who knows what they’re doing online…privacy and 
innovation are not incompatible.”53  
In addition to the FCC’s isolated pursuit of Verizon, the agency has made 
additional attempts to reign in phone companies’ management of consumer data. In 
July 2015, the FCC entered into a Consent Decree54 with two phone companies, 
TerraCom and YourTel America, exacting a fine of $3.5 million (joint and several) 
for storing, without any encryption or other robust security systems, consumer data, 
                                                
 48 Id. at 673-76 (acknowledging recent acceleration of FTC regulatory attempts in the 
consumer data privacy sphere while euphemistically labelling the FTC hands-off approach as 
“nudging . . . bottom up . . . a series of small steps . . . self-regulation”). 
 49 Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman Urges FCC to Protect Consumer Privacy as 
Commission Weighs Greater Restrictions on Use of Personal Information by Broadband 
Internet Access Providers (June 30, 2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-urges-fcc-protect-consumer-privacy-commission-weighs-greater. 
 50 FCC, In re Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, No. 16-106 (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-39A1_Rcd.pdf (“[W]ell-functioning 
commercial marketplaces rest on informed consent. Permission is required before purchasers 
can be said to agree to buy a product; permission is needed before owners of property transfer 
their interests in that property.”) Thus, it is reasonable to assume, and unreasonable to deny, 
that our internet-based economy can continue to be well-functioning even if a more robust 
consent process were interposed, such as opt-in rather than opt-out, and gradations of privacy 
rather than all-or nothing. 
 51 In re Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, 31 FCC Rcd. 1843 (2016). 
 52 Cecilia Kang, Verizon Settles with F.C.C. Over Hidden Tracking via ‘Supercookies,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2016 (“[T]he F.C.C. said it found that even among customers who had 
tried to delete regular cookies from their mobile browsers, the supercookies, or hidden code 
unique to each customer, were undeletable and used as a workaround to continue data 
collection.”). 
 53 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Settles Verizon 
“Supercookie” Probe, Requires Consumer Opt-In for Third Parties (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-338091A1.pdf.  
 54 In re TerraCom, Inc. & YourTel America, Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 7075 (2015). 
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including names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and driver’s 
license numbers of consumers seeking low-income Lifeline telephone services.55 In 
April 2015, the FCC fined AT&T $25 million for failure to reasonably secure 
proprietary consumer information and ordered AT&T to improve its data security 
organizations and procedures.56 In September 2014, the FCC exacted a $7.4 million 
fine from Verizon in a consent decree arising out of Verizon’s use of “its customers’ 
personal information when tailoring marketing campaigns without first providing its 
customers with the required notice or obtaining their consent.”57 These FCC consent 
orders, among several others,58 have served as important steps in the right direction 
to demand that electronic communication be operated in a manner that preserves 
consumer privacy except to the extent expressly, voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived by the consumer. 
VI. EUROPE IS FAR AHEAD ON CONSUMER PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND 
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
In France, the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 
(“CNIL”), applying France’s Data Protection Act,59 has ordered Microsoft to stop 
collecting excessive data60 on Windows 10 users without their express consent to sell 
the data to marketers.61 Indeed, Europe has dramatically controlled electronic 
                                                
 55 See generally Robert Sprague & Corey Ciochetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting 
Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 91, 97-101 (2009) (providing that as collection, aggregation, and dissemination 
of data expand, risks related to inadvertent or intentional data breaches and data thefts 
amplifies risks to consumer privacy online). 
 56 In re AT&T Services, Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 2808 (2015). 
 57 In re Verizon Compliance with the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Governing 
Customer Proprietary Network Info., 29 FCC Rcd. 10303 (2014). 
 58 E.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. EB-IHD-14-0017829 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 
Nov. 5, 2015); Cellco Partnership, 31 FCC Rcd. 1843; AT&T Services, 30 FCC Rcd. 2808.   
 59 Décret 2005-1309 du 20 octobre 2005 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux 
libertés [Decree 20050-1309 of October 20, 2005 on Data Processing, Files and Individual 
Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Mar. 25, 2007; Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à technologie de l’information, 
aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data 
Files and Individual Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 17, 2014. 
 60 Including, without limitation, information on all apps downloaded and time spent on 
each one, all collected via an advertising identifier activated “by default when Windows 10 is 
installed, enabling Windows apps and other parties’ apps to monitor user browsing and to 
offer targeted advertising without obtaining users’ consent.” Commission Nationale de 
l’Informatique et des Libertés, Windows 10: CNIL publicly serves formal notice to Microsoft 
Corporation to comply with the French Data Protection Act within three months (July 20, 
2016), https://www.cnil.fr/en/windows-10-cnil-publicly-serves-formal-notice-microsoft-
corporation-comply-french-data-protection. 
 61 Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, Chair, National Data Protection Commission, Decision No. 
2016-058 (June 30, 2016) (serving a formal notice on Microsoft Corporation) (France). 
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communications and Internet service to protect consumer data privacy62 and has 
done so without any measurable damage to the European economy.63 As the 
European Commission has noted,  
Whenever you open a bank account, join a social networking website or 
book a flight online, you hand over vital personal information such as 
your name, address, and credit card number. What happens to this data? 
Could it fall into the wrong hands? What rights do you have regarding 
your personal information? Everyone has the right to the protection of 
personal data. Under EU law, personal data can only be gathered legally 
under strict conditions, for a legitimate purpose. Furthermore, persons or 
[organizations] which collect and manage your personal information must 
protect it from misuse and must respect certain rights of the data owners 
which are guaranteed by EU law.64 
Although Europe has tried to apply those restrictions more globally through 
international agreements, the European Union’s adopted rules and directives only 
apply to Europe (and presumably to digital data entering or leaving Europe), and 
many American firms have contested such intrusion of European regulations into 
American cyberspace.65 
Throughout Europe, there has been a growing trend to compel Internet service 
providers to provide a mechanism for users who wish to be “forgotten” on the 
Internet, that is, who wish their digital information footprint trimmed or excised.66 
Google has begun to migrate that possibility to the United States.67 Of course, 
                                                
 62 See, e.g., 2010 O.J. (C.83) 7 (defining a right to respect for private and family life); 
EUR. CONSULT. ASS’N, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as Amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, art. 8 (1950) (defining a right to 
respect for private and family life); EUR. CONSULT. ASS’N, Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981). 
 63 That is a critical fact given that one of the theories underpinning the FTC’s laissez faire 
approach to Internet regulation is that any intrusive regulation would impede the American 
economy. That appears to be a bogeyman and not a substantive concern based on Europe’s 
experience. 
 64 Protection of Personal Data, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
 65 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of A Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1053-54 (2000). 
 66 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 24, 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 12 (defining the right to be forgotten); see also 
Case C-131-12, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR 
- Lex CELEX LEXIS 1 (May 13, 2014). 
 67 “If you are worried about your online privacy, it might be of interest to you that Google 
has quietly brought its Google forget program to the U.S. It has made it quite simple, for the 
most part. Simply go to myactivity.google.com to see the history of your searches, YouTube 
viewing and everything else you do on Google platforms, and then be guided through the 
process of trimming that history.” Evan Schuman, Google Quietly Brings Forgetting to the 
U.S., COMPUTERWORLD (July 13, 2016), 
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conversely, some view excising information from the Internet as selective 
censorship.68 
Given globalization and the international reach of the Internet and Internet 
service providers, perhaps international treaties are the venue with the proper scope 
for curtailing privacy erosions worldwide. Even if those global treaties were ratified, 
each nation must protect its own Internet and telecommunications users because 
once the data is disseminated and stored, it can be stolen, sold, aggregated, and 
shared without regard to any treaty-based restrictions. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND A CALL FOR ACTION 
It is past time for the FTC, other agencies, the balance of the executive branch, 
and Congress to step in and control this torrent of purloined consumer data.69 
Personal privacy causes of action are not enough, and digital data, once shared or 
stored, are forever vulnerable to dissemination and misuse. If some consumers wish 
to waive their privacy interests and opt-in to data sharing and storage, then that right 
and power certainly rests with those consumers. However, for those consumers who 
value privacy, but wish to avail themselves of modern technologies without 
sacrificing their privacy unawares or without free consent, opaque privacy waivers 
that consumers merely click through without understanding are no substitute for real 
and substantive consumer privacy protections in the digital age. It is time to recast 
Internet clickwrap, browsewrap, click-through, and “I Agree” privacy waiver 
fictions as unenforceable waivers of adhesion. 
 
  
                                                
http://www.computerworld.com/article/3094833/data-privacy/google-quietly-brings-
forgetting-to-the-u-s.html. 
 68 Qichen Zhang, Google Joins Twitter in Move Toward Selective Censorship, OPENNET 
INITIATIVE (Feb. 3, 2012), https://opennet.net/blog/2012/02/google-joins-twitter-move-toward-
selective-censorship. 
 69 In spite of commentators’ insistence, private enforcement of a privacy tort, Andrew J. 
McClurg, A Thousand Words and Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003), even within a class action framework, occurs 
only after the data is shared and breached, and ignores the power and reach of legislative 
intervention on such a classically interstate concern. 
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